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The intent of this thesis is to investigate the decision
making mechanism whereby Defense funding levels are deter-
mined. To accomplish this, simple linear decision models sim-
ilar to those employed by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky for
the non-defense appropriation process are used in analyzing
Congressional responses to Department of Defense budget re-
quests. Defense budgetary data for the Fiscal 1953-1971
time frame are empirically tested via time-series and cross-
sectional linear regression analysis for Procurement and
RDT&E . Results are tabulated and discussed. Model strengths
as well as weaknesses are evaluated based on their statisti-
cal properties and level of data aggregation. Significant
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more notable outcomes of the Vietnam conflict
is the increased dissatisfaction with defense policies and
growing public demands to reorder national priorities. Of
particular concern to the nation's taxpayers is the manner
in which the Congress determines the annual budget for the
many governmental agencies. Numerous methodologies have been
employed by political scientists to describe the budgetary
process; one of these being through a series of simple, lin-
ear, stochastic models. These attempts at description have
been more or less successful depending upon the premise being
investigated and the level of data aggregation used.
Studies of the Congress conducted by political scientists
Richard F. Fenno, Aaron Wildavsky, and the team of Davis,
Dempster and Wildavsky are generally regarded as the theo-
retical basis for most of the analyses being done today. By
interviewing numerous appropriations committee members and
observing committee behavior toward budget requests, Fenno
and Wildavsky were able to document apparent Congressional
appropriation procedures and personalities. Using this docu-
mented behavior Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky proposed a
series of simple, linear, stochastic models to empirically
test their hypothesis that the federal budgetary process
could be modelled by simple (basically incremental) decision
rules. In a series of published reports Davis, Dempster and
10

Wildavsky focused their attention on time-series analysis of
Congressional behavior toward selected non-defense agency
budget requests. The data used for their studies covered a
period of 16 years (1947-1963) and was taken from records of
agency requests and subsequent Congressional action on these
requests. From their studies Davis et al. were able to con-
clude that Congressional behavior toward non-defense budget
requests did, in fact, appear to follow their postulated de-
cision rules [Ref. 11].
Criticism of the Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky studies
has centered around the following issues:
1. the models describe the outcome of the budgetary
process and not the process itself [Ref. 35];
2. possibly, Davis et al. should have examined request
and appropriations at a lower level of aggregation rath-
er than total agency proposals and appropriations [Ref.
24];
3. the studies say nothing about programs [Ref. 31].
In response to this criticism, Johnson [Ref. 24] examined
various non-defense agency budget requests in terms of ob-
jects of expenditures (Personal Services, Travel, Equipment,
etc.). Citing Fenno's work in Congressional-agency relation-
ships and selected works in organizational theory, Johnson
formulated a series of simple, linear, stochastic models of
agency requests based on increments in the requests for the
years 1949-1960. As a result of his analysis Johnson con-
cluded that:
"Agencies can be described as conforming to the
patterns established by previous Bureau of the
Budget and Congressional actions on their requests."
[Ref. 24, p. 22]
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Noting that they had neglected to include the Department
of Defense in their studies Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky
stated that "there is no reason to believe that these models
are not equally applicable to the defense appropriations
process" [Ref. 1, p. 301]. Arnold Kanter disputed this
claim. From his studies of Congressional reaction to de-
fense budget requests in the period 1960-1970 Kanter con-
cluded that the Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky results were
applicable only to non-defense agencies since, unlike the
defense budget, a majority of non-defense expenditures are
uncontrollable (fixed by statute and/or trust and not sub-
ject to annual review) by the Congress and few new projects
are introduced by the agencies [Ref. 26, p. 129-143].
o 4- *. ^.™k ^ -^ ~ rn^-f o/?i u <-, ,-, .,^^^3 +- u ^ •n,-, tt-; ,-. r\^»viv-* <-*-*- ^-n o n A
Wildavsky idea of linear, stochastic decision models to de-
scribe the defense appropriations process for the years
FY1953-1968. Focusing mainly on describing the decision
making process for the various actors in the defense budget-
ary cycle (agency, Bureau of the Budget, House and Senate
Appropriations Subcommittees), Stromberg's study does pro-
vide some evidence that the Davis et al . concept of simple,
linear, stochastic decision models has merit for DoD-Con-
gressional interaction.
The objective of this thesis is to directly apply the
concept of simple, linear (basically incremental) decision
rules -- similar to those postulated by Davis, Dempster, and
Wildavsky -— to Congressional behavior toward DoD budget
12

requests for RDT&E and Procurement. When examing agency and
Congressional behavior with respect to DoD budget requests
in RDT&E and Procurement, it is possible to focus on total
budgets and/or on the items within these budgets. In this
study the full range of data aggregation - from total RDT&E
and Procurement budgets to program elements within these
budgets-will be subjected to analysis. After fitting a
series of postulated decision models to each aggregation lev-
el consideration will be given to determing which models
realize the best fit for the data.
The actual organization of the analysis includes back-
ground on the defense budgetary process during which an ef-
fort will be made to identify the roles and impact of the
Congress. This section is followed by chapters on model
description, criteria for testing the significance of a mod-
el and/or its coefficients, and empirical results with em-
phasis on identifying those models with greatest descriptive
potential. Finally, the significance of the empirical re-




This section is designed to provide an understanding of
the defense budgetary cycle, both before and after the intro-
duction of PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System)
into the Department of Defense's planning process. A de-
tailed chronology of a defense budget cycle is given with
emphasis placed on identifying the roles played by the serv-
ices (as members of the Defense Department), the Department
of Defense (as a Federal agency) and the Congress (a decision
maker for appropriations matters). Finally, current litera-
ture on budgetary matters is reviewed to provide an under-
standing of the theoretical basis for using simple, linear
(basically incremental) decision models to describe the budg-
etary process.
A. DEFENSE BUDGETING PRIOR TO 1961
Prior to 1961, the level of defense spending was deter-
mined (except in times of war) by what has been described as
the "budget ceiling" approach. The President would indicate
the general level of defense spending which he felt was ap-
propriate for the international climate and his economic and
fiscal policies. The Secretary of Defense would then allo-
cate this figure among the military departments. Each mili-
tary department would in turn prepare the basic budget
submission, allocating its portion of the military budget
among its functions, units, and activities. Additional
14

funding requests were also submitted for those activities
imperative to national defense which could not be accommo-
dated within the basic budgetary needs in what has become
known as the "B" list (for example, the Navy's Polaris Pro-
gram). Then all of the budget submissions were reviewed
together by the Secretary of Defense.
The consequences of such fiscal planning are fairly ob-
vious. Each service tended to exercise its own priorities,
favoring its own unique missions to the detriment of the
joint military mission. They (services) strived to establish
the groundwork for an increased share of future budgets by
concentrating on new weapons systems while protecting the
present sizes of their forces. Moreover, because attention
was focused on only the upcoming fiscal year, the individual
services had every incentive to propose new systems, the
full costs of which would only be realized in subsequent
years.
Another detrimental aspect of this method of budgeting
was the almost complete separation of budgeting and planning.
These critically important functions were performed by two
different groups; planning by the military establishment and
budgeting by the civilian secretaries of defense. As a re-
sult, the Secretaries found that decisions on force levels
and programs had to be made on the basis of little informa-
tion within a period of a. few weeks allocated for budget re-
view near the end of the budget cycle. Moreover, each year
the plans and programs provided by the services had to be
15

cut back to fit within the President's budget ceiling estab-
lished for that fiscal year. Beyond that budget, plans con-
tinued to be formulated with the hope that the next year's
ceiling would be higher [Ref. 23].
B. DEFENSE BUDGETING, 1961 TO THE PRESENT - THE PPBS CYCLE
To streamline defense budgeting the concept of program
budgeting was integrated into the Defense Department's fis-
cal planning process. In the context of program budgeting,
the program was meant to be the basic planning unit that
would bring together all of the resources required for a
specific mission. While the actual mechanics of the present
planning cycles differ somewhat from those established in
the early sixties, the basic philosophy of program budgeting
has remained the same. The following is a summary of the
present process.
Prior to formal budget submission to the Congress as an
integral part of the total Federal budget, the DoD budget
undergoes approximately 18 months of development and review
within the Defense Department. The preparation process,
known as the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System or
PPBS, includes three distinct phases: planning (six months);
programming (nine months); and budgeting (three months).
The planning phase primarily involves threat analysis
and force level requirements determination to counter these
threats, first unconstrained by cost and then under tenta-
tive fiscal constraints established by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). Once the views of the National
16

Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and SECDEF on
desired force levels have been examined and evaluated a
Joint Force Memorandum or JFM is formulated and distributed
to the services [Ref . 4]
.
Receipt of the JFM by the services officially signals
the beginning of the programming phase. In a continuous
dialogue between OSD and the services the manpower, weapon
system and resource requirements necessary to obtain and
maintain those forces as outlined in the JFM are considered.
At the end of this phase OSD provides the services with Pro-
gram Decision Memorandums which review all relevant opinions
and decisions of OSD on military needs for the next five
years. The end product of the programming phase is the Five
Year Defense Plan (FYDP) which contains DoD's updated list
of programs, program elements, force levels and attendant
resources for the ensuing fiscal year and the following four
years. It should be noted that this phase emphasizes pro-
grams through coordination by SECDEF across service lines
and the determination and evaluation of tradeoffs among pro-
grams and program elements.
The final phase, budgeting, occurs during the period
from October through December immediately preceding submis-
sion of the budget to the Congress in January. Up to this
point the budget has been considered in program format and
must now be transformed into appropriation categories before
being submitted to the Congress. This transformation (known
as crosswalking) is the process by which resources needed to
17

support the program elements are aggregated into appropria-
tion categories. As an illustration of this process, con-
sider Figure 1. Determination of MILITARY PERSONNEL
requirements-NAVY (MPN) involves going through all program
elements in the Navy budget and summing their individual
MILITARY PERSONNEL resource requirements. This sum repre-
sents the total Navy MILITARY PERSONNEL funding needs. A
similar procedure is followed to determine the other appro-
priation category requirements. A complete breakdown of
Major Defense Programs and Congressional Appropriation Cate-
gories is included as Figure 2.
Once the program needs are crosswalked into the various
appropriation categories they are forv/arded to OSD and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and inte-
gration into the President's Federal budget and subsequent
submission to the Congress.
Completion of the formal PPB cycle in no way marks the
end of DoD's consideration of its budget request. In real-
ity, submission of the budget to Congress signifies the be-
ginning of a new dialogue; this time between the Congress
and the Department of Defense. During the Authorization and
Appropriation Committees' review of the defense budget a re-
quest for additional information on a specific line item
(for example, Navy A-7E Attack Aircraft) or the impact of a
reduction in funding for an entire program will generate
further analyses of that line item by OSD or the service in-
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the strengths or weaknesses of a request and the underlying
desires of Congress.
Congress is supposed to review and appropriate funds
based on a submitted budget before the beginning of the new
fiscal year. However, since the late 1960's, it has not
been unusual for the authorization and appropriation hear-
ings on major programs in the defense budget to last more
than six months (for example, the FY 1974 Defense Appropria-
tion Bill was finally reported out of Committee in late De-
cember some six months after the beginning of the fiscal
year). When it is apparent that legislative consideration
of the defense budget cannot be completed prior to the be-
ginning of the fiscal year a continuance in funding is gen-
erally granted for those programs already in existence at
the levels prescribed by the previous appropriation bill.
Each step of the legislative review process serves to
limit or constrain final funding levels. The defense budget
first goes to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
for authorization action where an upper limit is established
on funding for each program and program elements. Military
Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, and part of Procure-
ment have a continuing authorization and, as such, are not
reviewed by these committees. Annual authorization action
has been required for procurement of aircraft, missiles, or
naval vessels since December 31, 1960; Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) since FY 1963; Tracked Combat
Vehicles since FY 1968; Other Weapons since FY 1970; and
21

Torpedoes since FY 1971. Legislative procedure requires
that the House and Senate pass separate Authorization Bills.
If the bills, as passed, are not identical joint conference
action is required to remove existing differences. The re-
sulting Authorization Bill is then passed to the respective
House and Senate Defense Appropriation Subcommittees for de-
termination of actual funding levels (final appropriations
must be within the upper limits established by the Authori-
zation Bill). Separate hearings are held by these subcom-
mittees during which line item requests are reviewed with
key witnesses from the Services. Particular attention is
directed towards determining the need for and relative worth
of a weapon system in light of total defense needs. The
final Defense Appropriation Bill, when reported out of com-
mittee, delineates the level of New Obligational Authority
(NOA) allocated to the appropriation categories and repre-
sents an upper limit to which the Federal Government may be
obligated by the Defense Department during the obligational
period associated with a specific appropriations category
(see Figure 2 for lengths of obligational periods).
The final phase of the budget cycle is conducted by the
Services after the defense budget is signed into law by the
President. During this phase the Congressional allocations
to the appropriation categories are crosswalked back into
Defense budget format. If a specific program element has
been cut by the Congress then that program is funded accord-
ingly. To allocate undistributed reductions in funding,
22

decisions must be made as to which programs and/or program
elements are to be affected. Once these decisions have been
made the budget cycle is complete.
While the defense budget has been portrayed as a sequence
of distinct phases it is, in reality, a continuim of inter-
dependent events. At any one time there are several Fiscal
Year budgets being considered and decisions/inquiries rele-
vant to one impacts upon the others. Changing assessment (s)
of future threats by the Congress or JCS creates an atmos-
phere of uncertainty in which the military organizations
must plan for their future needs. The means by which a de-
gree of stability is created within this uncertainty forms
the theoretical basis for the Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky
models and is discussed next.
C. BUDGETING LITERATURE REVIEW
Behaviorists have divided the environmental field into
four basic fields: (1) placid, randomized; (2) placid, clus-
tered; (3) disturbed reactive; and (4) dynamic-turbulent
[Ref. 10, p. 435-447]. While each of these four types de-
scribe the characteristics of the relationship between a
type of environmental setting and organizational behavior
the dynamic-turbulent best describes that of Federal agencies
and bureaus. Federal agency budgets are influenced not only
by interactions between agencies and other organizations





Characteristic of the dynamic-turbulent environment is
the degree of uncertainty in which organizations must func-
tion and the manner in which this uncertainty is reduced to
an acceptable level. In their studies of organizational be-
havior Cyert and March found that organizations attempted to
reduce uncertainty by relying less on long-range planning
and more on short-run reaction to feedback from the environ-
ment and by attempting to establish a receptive (or at least
a predictable) environment [Ref. 10].
Fenno and Wildavsky noted this type of behavior in their
studies of Congressional/non-defense agency interaction.
Fenno, in The Power of the Purse
,
asserts that agencies have
certain expectations about the budgetary process; they ex-
pect fair play, that is, to receive the same treatment as
other agencies; they desire to have their budget requests
evaluated on the merits of program activities. Also, agen-
cies attempted to reduce funding uncertainty by maintaining
stable relationships with the Congressional Appropriation
Committees in order to minimize conflict. Budget reductions
naturally hurt the agencies but agency officials felt that
their activities were hurt more by not knowing what the other
participants in the budgetary process would do from year to
year or why they behaved the way they did [Ref. 20, p. 273].
Feelings of uncertainty and the maintenance of expecta-
tions were not confined solely to the agencies. George H.
Mahon, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Department of De-
fense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
summed up committee uncertainty when he stated:
24

"No human being regardless of his position and
capacity could possibly be completely familiar
with all of the items of appropriations contained
in a defense bill." [Ref. 20, p. 10].
In his interviews with committee officials, Fenno found that
Congress felt that agencies should treat the public fairly;
that they should have some understanding of the Congress,
the work of the committees and the individual committee mem-
bers and; that the agencies should be "frank and open and
not attempt to cover-up or hold back relevant information"
in their dealings with the Congress [Ref. 20, p. 320].
Based on their interviews and observations of the budg-
etary process, Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky felt that it
was not unreasonable to hypothesize that Congressional reac-
tion to a submitted budget might best be explained by a mod-
el (or series of models) that, were simple and stable over
time. Furthermore, based on agency expectations that the
Appropriation Committees accept its basic or core programs
and focus on the additional increment being requested for
that year, some form of linear model was assumed. This as-
sumption appears to be reasonable in that Fenno also noted
that
:
"Just as the agency considers much of its request
to be beyond controversy, so too does the committee
act on this assumption by restricting its purview
to those budgetary increments granted in the pre-
vious year and requests for the coming year." [Ref.
20, p. 318].
While their empirical analyses were confined entirely to
non-defense federal agencies, Fenno and Wildavsky 's studies
appear to be applicable to the budgetary process in general.
25

This plus the fact that a majority of Defense Subcommittee
members also sit on non-defense subcommittees makes it rea-
sonable to assume that their concept of simple, linear (bas-





The models suggested in this thesis for Congressional be-
havior when considering DoD budget requests are similar to
those used by Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky to describe the
Congressional/non-defense agency budgetary process. Their
basic structure suggests a set of possible decision rules
that are linear, stable over periods of time, stochastic,
and strategic in nature. In reality, they may be thought of
as "as if" models in that realizing a good fit for a given
model means only that the actual behavior of the participants
appears to follow the relationship suggested by the model.
The models do not attempt to describe the decision making
process in minutiae but rather in an input output sense
where the President's budget submission may be considered
to be the input variables and final Congressional appropria-
tions as the output quantity.
For each model the constant term, normally found in a
linear model, is suppressed in order to interpret the coef-
ficient(s) as increments or percentage figures. Although
intuitively appealing, models of this type have somewhat
different statistical properties and thereby present some
difficulty in empirical testing and evaluation (see Chapter
IV). Each model also contains a random error term which ac-
counts for events that might otherwise upset the simplicity
of the model. Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky describe such
events in the following manner:
27

"Occasionally, world events take an unexpected turn,
a new President occupies the White House, some agen-
cies act with exceptional zeal, others suffer drastic
losses of confidence on the part of the appropria-
tions subcommittees, and so on." [Ref. 11, p. 531].
For each of the models the following definition of vari-
ables apply:
X. - agency funding request in year t as contained in
the President's budget
Y - final Congressional appropriations for a given




- agency funding request in year t-1
Y
1
- final Congressional appropriations for a request
in year t-1
e. - stochastic error or disturbance term. e^ is
t
usually assumed to be normally distributed with
mean zero and constant variance with the
sequence (e.) being independently and identically
distributed random variates
A. SERVICE DECISION MODELS
Before attempting to model Congressional reaction toward
a submitted defense budget it is necessary to investigate
different possible strategies that the services may be using
to formulate their requests, for the Congress may know the
specific decision rule being used by the services and react
accordingly.
The first model attempts to describe a service's behav-
ior when, though convinced of the worth of its programs, it
It is felt that omitting supplemental budget requests
will not significantly distort study results. In the more
recent years supplemental requests have been used as a
"launching point" for new projects (for example, the Navy's
Patrol Frigate) and if accepted in the supplemental budget
these projects are included in the next year's main budget.
28

realizes that extraordinarily large or small requests tend
to precipitate unfavorable Congressional reaction. There-
fore, in an effort to secure the necessary funding while
avoiding suspicion, the agency will tend to request a per-
centage of the previous year's appropriation. This percent-
age will be stable over time. However, favorable (unfavorable)
events may generate requests that are larger (smaller) than




= B ° Yt-i+£ t (R1)
where 3o represents the percentage of the previous appropria-
tion requested and z. the random error term.
The second request model attempts to explain the actions
of the service that is convinced of the worth of its pro-
grams regardless of previous Congressional action. This
type of behavior is especially appealing when the Congress
has confidence in the agency and tends to appropriate amounts
equal to or greater than the requests submitted. According-
ly, the annual request for such a program should be a fairly








may be used to investigate such behavior. In the absence of
exogenous events, the request in year t should be greater
than the request in the previous year (t-1).
29

Finally, a service may desire to smooth out its stream
of appropriations by taking into account the difference be-
tween its request and appropriation in the previous year.
This difference may be thought of as a barameter — an indi-
cation of how well past request(s) have been received in
order to determine which areas to emphasize in the present






t-l+6 3< Yt-l-Xt-l )+e t
(R3)
where 3 represents the percentage of the previous year's
appropriation being requested and 3 the percentage differ-
ence between last year's appropriation and request desired.
B. CONGRESSIONAL2 DECISION MODELS
In order to investigate the many possible decision strat-
egies that the Congress may have used in determining funding
level a series of models were postulated. Each model at-
tempts to link expressed Congressional feelings and desires
with possible behavior.
The first model considers Congressional response to a
defense agency to be a function of that agency's request.
This type of behavior may result if the Congress feels that
the agency's requests are realistic and, as a result, a
fairly stable indication of that agency's needs to carry out
2
In the context of this study "Congressional" means the
aggregate authorization and appropriation committees impact
on the Defense budget.
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existing and planned programs. Should this be the case then
Congress may respond by appropriating a relatively fixed
percentage of the request. Such behavior may be expressed
mathematically as
Y = a X.+e. (Al)
where a represents the percentage appropriated and e the
stochastic error term.
Next, suppose that although Congress usually grants a
fixed percentage of the agency request, it sometimes happens
that this amount represents an expenditure which extends the
agency's programs either above or below the size desired by
Congress. Such a situation could result when an agency fol-
lows Presidential aims which differ significantly from those
of the Congress. In this situation Congress may appropriate
a sum different from its usual percentage. Then, in the
following year, should agency and Congressional aims become
more aligned (X approximately equal to Y -. ) the Congress
may attempt to make allowances for the deviation out of the
current year appropriation. If a represents the usual per-
centage appropriated then
Y
t %h +v t
may be used to describe such behavior; where v is the sto-
chastic disturbance term that takes on unusually large posi-

























the second Congressional decision model.
Finally, specialization by subcommittee members allows
some members of Congress to have substantial knowledge of
the military services and their budget formulation. This
knowledge may aid the appropriation subcommittees in identi-
fying the decision model used by the services to formulate
their request or proposed program expansion for a given year.
For example, if Congress knows that decision model Rl was
used to formulate agency requests then the subsequent appro-
priation decision model may include this information. The
model
Y+ = a X +a X+e+t 3 t 4 t t
may be used to describe such behavior when X^ = X -3 Y^ .
.
t to t-l
Substitution for A provides for the third decision model
Y = a X.+a (X -3 Y )+e (A3)
Z 3 Z 4 t t-l t
On the other hand, should the appropriation committee members




5Vas<Vxt-i> +E t (A4)
may best describe such concern. The variable (X -X )
should provide a reasonable indication of agency desires to




The series of models postulated for this study of Con-
gressional-DoD interaction in no way exhausts the list of
3possible models. They are, however, consistent with the
data available and maintain the concept of incrementalism
and simple decision rules suggested by Davis, Dempster, and
Wildavsky. It should be noted that these models do not dis-
tinguish between actions initiated by the House and Senate
Armed Services Appropriations Committees. For studies of
these committees see Fenno [Ref. 19] and Lukenas [Ref. 28].
3 Numerous other models were examined in preliminary
testing-Congressional decision rules similar to A3 but with
R2 and R3 as the agency decision rule, log-linear analogs of
all the previously described models, and several so called
"agency base" models to list a few. Test results for Con-
gressional decision model A3 with R2 and R3 as the agency
request strategy indicated that the gaming coefficient was
statistically insignificant. For the log-linear models
little improvement in predictive power was noted.
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IV. MODEL SELECTION CRITERION
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky have used adjusted coeffi-
cient of determination (R2 ) to judge the adequacy of the fit
of a model to the data [Ref. 11, p. 274]. Stromberg has
noted that there are methodological problems with linear
regression without a constant term and that "R 2 is not an
especially desirable measure of goodness fit." As an alter-
nate measure of model fit Stromberg proposed the use of "W 2
or proportion of variation explained" [Ref. 36, p. 21-24]
.
This author believes that only "the tip of the iceberg" has
been noted and that other methodology problems may exist
when evaluating linear regression models with a suppressed
constant term.
To acquaint the reader with the methodological differ-
ences between linear regression with and without a constant
term a general review of linear regression theory for models
with a constant term and its validity for models with a sup-
pressed constant is included in part A. Part B documents
those statistical tests to be used for testing and evaluation
of the models proposed in the previous chapter. Particular
attention is given to identifying the impact of suppressing
the constant term on test validity. Finally, part C dis-
cusses selected nonparametric criteria that were employed
when necessary parametric assumptions were questionable.
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A. LINEAR REGRESSION THEORY
1. Linear Regression with a Constant Term
Suppose that there are n observations (X. ,Y ),
(X. J* .Y,^.. ),...., (X.j ,Y. ) where X__ is defined as the in-v t+1 t+1 t+n t+n t
dependent variable and Y the dependent variable. Further
suppose that after plotting these n observations a linear
relationship of the form
Y. = 3 +3 X +e ; t=l,... ,n (1)
X 1 L X
where: Y and X are as previously defined
8 = the constant term (intercept coefficient)
o
8 = the slope coefficient
e = random error term (difference between actual
and estimated value of Y )
is postulated. The sum of squares of deviations from the
regression line is
S = Ji *\ = JiCVB.-B.I,.) 1 . (2)
The objective of least-squares regression is to select 8
and 8j (estimators of 8 and 8j) to be those values which,
when substituted for 8 and 8 , produce the least possible
value of S. These values may be determined by differenti-
ating equation (2); first with respect to 8 and then 8 and
setting these results equal to zero. The solution to the





tii y t-[<ii xt )( tiiw minn *
t
z
=i K-^th V 2 'n
and g = Y-gjX . (4)
Up to this point no assumptions that involve proba-
bility distributions have been made. If it can be assumed
that, in equation (1)
a. e. is a random variable with mean zero and constant var-
iance a 2 (unknown); and
b. e. and z... are uncorrelated, i^O
then the Gauss-Markov theorem insures that the least-squares
estimators 3 and 3, are minimum variance, unbiased estima-
tors in the class of estimators that are linear in the ob-
servations.
If it is further assumed that the e.'s are
t
c. independently, identically distributed normal random





% N(0,a 2 )
then 3 and 3 achieved the Cramer-Rao lower bound for vari-
ance of an estimator [Ref. 25, p. 8-33].
2. Linear Regression without a Constant Term




= 3 1Xt+et ; t=l, ... ,n (5)
is postulated for the data. The sum of squares of deviations




' = Ji e t = Ji <V B .V 2 (6)
Minimization of S' yields only one Normal equation from








Since there is but one Normal equation, the sum of the error
n
terms ( t £-j e t ) may or may not equal zero for linear regres-
sion without a constant.
The importance of this result becomes apparent when
reviewing the assumptions outlined in section Al . If the
regression line naturally passes through the origin then 3
n
n
and £.. e will be zero. If, however, the regression line
does not pass through the origin and the constant term is
n
suppressed then ,£.. c will not be zero. Should this be the
case, the validity of assumptions a, b, and c is questionable
B. STATISTICAL CRITERIA FOR TESTING LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS
1. Significance of Estimated Coefficients
The t-statistic is used to test the statistical sig-
nificance of a coefficient and is defined as the ratio of
the difference between the coefficient's estimated and hy-




[Ref. 25, p. 37]. Theoretically the error terms need to be
normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance.
However, there are simulations which have shown "t" to be
fairly robust towards distributional assumptions. Therefore,
the "t" test will be considered valid for linear models with
a suppressed constant.
2. Coefficient of Determination
Coefficient of determination or R 2 is a standard
measure of "goodness of fit" for linear regression models
and is defined as the proportion of (sample) variance (in the
dependent variable) explained by the fitted regression line.
When all of the dependent variable observations in the sample
coincide with the least-squares regression estimates R 2
equals one, a perfect fit. As the proportion of total vari-
ance that remains unexplained increases R 2 approaches zero.
The usual computational formula for estimating R 2
for a data sample is
t=lu t t ;
n
R 2 = 1 -
v% 2E (Y -Yl
unexplained variance of the dependent
1 variable about the regression line
total variance of the dependent
variable about its mean
[Ref. 33, p. 45]
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Replacing (Y -Y ) 2 by e 2 , the square of the error
term for observation t, the formula for R 2 used here will be,
n




Stromberg [Ref. 36, p. 21-24] has pointed out that
n
the interpretation of .£ e 2 as the (sample) unexplained
variance is not correct for linear regression models without
n
a constant term since . £ e. may or may not be zero. Inject-
ing £ into the expression for R 2 will not help since one
could theoretically obtain a high coefficient of determina-
tion when the average error about the regression line is
large but the spread about this average is small.
Stromberg and the BIOMED statistical package [Ref.
14] have addressed this problem by computing a somewhat dif-
ferent statistic. They have computed, instead, what Strom-
berg defines as W2 where
n
,2 ., 1=1 1
vr = i -
= i -
n
.£„ Y 2.i=l i
unexplained variation of the dependent
variable about zero
total variation of the dependent
variable about zero
The problem with this measure of goodness of fit is
that zero and not the regression line appears to have been
chosen somewhat arbitrarily as the point about which the
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variation in the dependent variable is computed. Also, if
E is equal to or near zero (which will be the case if the
computed intercept using a standard linear regression ap-
proach is zero) then with a positive Y (which is always the
case with budget data) W 2 may yield a value considerably
larger than R 2 and may be misleading to someone thinking in
terms of R 2 .
3. Standard Error of Estimate and Coefficient of Varia-
tion
Another measure of dispersion about the regression
line is the standard error of the estimate (SE) and may be





where: n = the number of sample observations
k = the number of parameters being estimated in the
regression
[Ref . 25, p. 129] . The numerical value of the standard er-
ror of estimate is inversely related to the goodness of fit
of the model.
It is somewhat difficult, however, to determine the
significance of the standard error of estimate when compar-
ing different sets of data. For this reason it is useful to
compute a relative standard error of estimate. The coeffi-
cient of variation (CV) is such a measure since it relates
the standard error of a particular model to the mean value




A value of less than 0.20 for the coefficient of variation
for a model is frequently cited as desirable [Ref. 33, p. 44]
One particularly desirable characteristic of both the stand-
ard error of estimate and coefficient of variation is that
they are not dependent upon any distributional assumptions
of the error terms.
C. NONPARAMETRIC CRITERIA FOR TESTING LINEAR REGRESSION
MODELS
1. The Mann-Whitney U Test
The Mann-Whitney U test may be used to test whether
two data sets have been drawn from the same population and
is useful when underlying distributional assumptions are
questionable.
First, suppose that there appears to be two distinct
sets of data; set A of size n
x
and set B of size n
2 (n 1 <n 2 ).
To test the null hypothesis that both sets are from the same
population the sample observations are pooled and ranked in
order of increasing size. The value of the U statistic is
computed by the formula





where S = the number of times that an observation in data
set B precedes an observation in set A [Ref. 6, p. 224]. If
T is greater than the tabled value for U, v for signifi-(n, ,n 2 )




The Durbin-Watson test and examination of residual
plots provide insight into identifying problems of misspeci-
fication and bias, respectively. However, in the case of
small samples (as in budget data for DoD and the agencies)
these techniques are often inconclusive. Also, the Durbin-
Watson test requires that the sum of the error terms equal
zero.
As an alternative means of identifying bias and/or
misspecif ication in a model with a suppressed constant term
Theil 's methodology for comparing estimates and actual ob-
servations was considered [Ref. 39, p. 19-32].
Theil uses the idea of mean square error (MSE) in





n i=l v i i y
n
.£. A 21=1 l
where: A. = the actual value of observation i
l
P. = A. (the predicted value of A.)
Next, the numerator of U is decomposed in the following man-
ner :
n i=l (P i~ A i






where: P = - .£., P. A=- .^ A.
n i=l i n i=l l
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SU - 7 - .E.,(P.-P) 2 S. = / - .E.,(A.-A) 2P V n i=l v 1 ' A y n i=l v 1
1
n
r = [- .E.(P.-P)(A.-A)]/SnS An i=l v l ' v i y ' P A
The first term (P-A) 2 will be zero if and only if the average
predicted value equals the average sample value. Positive
values of the first term will be errors of central tendency
or bias. The second term (Sp-S.)
2 will be zero if and only
if the standard deviations are equal. Positive values for
this term indicate errors of unequal variation. The third
term [2(l-r)SpS.] is zero if and only if the correlation co-
efficient between the predicted and actual values (r) is one
(that is, if the predicted values always account for varia-
tions in the actual values) or if Sp and/or S. equal zero, a
degenerate case.
A more convenient way of expressing this decomposi-











.E (P.-A. ) 2




- .E.( P .-A.) 2
n i=l v i i'
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UR , U,., and UR may be characterized as inequality proportions
where Ut-, is the bias proportion; U.. the variance proportion;
and UR the covariance proportion. Obviously UB+U +U =1.
If the above inequality proportions are to be of
value they must provide some insight into the quality of the
estimating relationship being evaluated. The term, UR ,
should be close to zero since least-squares estimation tech-
niques are used to derive coefficient estimates. A high
value of U,, indicates that the variance of the independent
M
variable has not been properly accounted for. In such a
case a search for other explanatory variables is in order.
In other words, the regression equation is not properly
specified. A high value of UR (along with low values of UR
and IL.) indicates that the equation is unbiased and properly
specified, but the inherent variation in the independent
variable cannot be completely explained [Ref. 1]
.
While the preceding discussion is brief it does
point out the problems with testing incremental regression
models. Additionally, no single criteria is a reliable test
of the postulated models. Therefore, the outcome of all of
the test statistics will be used to evaluate the data se-
lected to test the postulated decision rules.
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V. DATA SELECTION AND TESTING
A. SELECTION
1.. Appropriation Category
Selection of an appropriate data base centered around
acquiring sufficient time-series and cross-sectional data to
examine
:
a. the effects of aggregation on the suggested de-
cision rules used by the Congress when considering defense
appropriations. In particular, data for at least several
levels of aggregation (for example, DoD request for Procure-
ment, individual Service requests for Procurement, and Serv-
ice request for Procurement programs such as aircraft) were
considered. This was done in order to forestall criticism
similar to Johnson's for the Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky
analyses
;
b. possible differences in Congressional behavior
towards the different appropriations categories, i.e. does
Congress use a different decision rule when considering
RDT&E and Procurement ; and
c. discernible differences in Congressional behav-
ior when considering requests for programs that represent
physical hardware (such as the F-4E tactical fighter aircraft)
and those that include requests for non-identifiable weapons




Congressional chan o the total defense budget
for the period Fiscal Years lS&i -i^«o were studied to deter-
mine the magnitude and stabili i:y of these changes over time
(Figure 3). For this period percentage changes to the De-
fense budget ranged from +2.0% (1959) to -11.3% (1953) with
an average change of -2.5%.
Closer examination of Figure 3 reveals three impor-
tant results. First, Congressional changes to the Defense
budget appear to be fairly stable; Fiscal Year 1953 being
the only exception. This result tends to support the con-
cept of incrementalism suggested
. by Davis, Dempster and
Wildavsky — at least at the highest level of aggregation.
Next, the percentage changes between years oscillates in a
non-regular cycle between ±5%; again, FY 1953 generating the
only exceptions. Finally, those budgets formulated during a
Presidential election account for three of the four reduc-
tions that exceed 5%4 (FY 1953 = -11.3%; FY 1969 = -6.8%;
FY 1973 = -6.6%). These large reductions may have been the
result of election year politics and/or the military may
have been in the process of reducing force levels after a
major conflict. The latter appears to be the more plausible
explanation since the budgets for FY 1961 and FY 1965 were
not changed a significant amount while all of the larger
4
The Federal fiscal year is from July 1 to June 30. As
such, the FY 1953 budget was submitted to Congress in January





Congressional Changes to Defense Budget Requests:
FYs 1950-1973



















































Average Change = -2 Absolute Average Change = 2.8%
Source: Korb [Ref. 27, p. 53]
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reductions fall at or near the end of a major conflict (1953 -
Korea; 1969, 1970, and 1973 - Vietnam).
To determine the distribution of changes within the
Defense budget Congressional changes to the appropriation
categories of Military Personnel, Procurement, Operations and
Maintenance, and RDT&E were investigated. One major diffi-
culty with this type analysis was accounting for numerous
differences in the aggregation of program elements under
these categories (notably, Procurement and RDT&E) between the
periods FYs 1950-1959 and FYs 1960-1973. Stromberg [Ref. 36]
includes data for the period FYs 1953-1959 but also acknowl-
edges the problem of assigning specific program elements to
individual appropriation categories. Therefore, only the
latter period (FYs 1960-1973) for which published OSD figures
are available was considered. For this period changes to the
four categories ranged from +9.48% (RDT&E - FY 1962) to
-15.9% (Procurement - FY 1973). A complete summary of Con-
gressional changes to Military Personnel, Procurement, Opera-
tions and Maintenance, and RDT&E is includes as Figure 4.
Information provided by Figure 4 indicates that
:
(1) concentrating on the total defense budget tends to
obscure the much larger changes in the individual appropria-
tion categories;
(2) the majority of the larger changes were concentrated
in those categories that contain funds for development and





Congressional Changes (%) to the Defense Budget According
to Appropriation Categories; FYs 1960-1973
Category
Fiscal Year
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Military Personnel + 0.11 +0.18 -0.46 -1.12 -2.90
Operations & Maint
.
-0.65 -0.59 -0.53 -0.03 -0.66
Procurement -0.09 +3.32 -1.10 + 1.23 -6.09
RDT&E +1.19 +6.85 +9.48 +2.62 -4.31
Total Defense Budget -0.06 +1.68 +0.58 +0.48 -3.66
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Military Personnel -0.10 + 0.27 +0.29 -1.00 -1.92
Operations & Maint. -0.67 + 0.17 +0.18 -1.46 -4.49
Procurement -2.43 -0.07 +1.43 -4.00 -14.07
RDT&E -4.06 -2.07 +1.14 -2.25 -5.68
Total Defense Budget -1.51 -0.18 +0.70 -2.30 -6.75
1970 1971 1972 1973
Military Personnel -3.31 -1.23 -1.06 -1.88
Operations & Maint. -4.28 -0.78 -1.68 -2.42
Procurement -14.58 -7.65 -9.67 -15.91
RDT&E -10.37 -4.99 -5.41 -9.22
Total Defense Budget -7.49 -3.13 -4.02 -6.56
Absolute
Average Ch ange Average Change
Military Personnel -1.07 1.13
Operations & Maintenance -1.30 1.32
Procurement -5.40 5.82
RDT&E -3.45 4.97
Source: Korb [Ref. 27, p. 55]
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(3) the reduction in defense spending which has accom-
panied termination of active participation in Vietnam combat
operations has been borne primarily by Procurement and RDT&E
rather than being equally distributed among all appropriation
categories.
This last point has been used by both Kanter [Ref. 26] and
Korb [Ref. 17] to draw basically divergent conclusions con-
cerning the nature of Congressional interest in the Defense
budget. Kanter claims that concentration of changes in Pro-
curement and RDT&E implies that Congress maintains a program-
matic orientation (making decisions on the basis of the type
of weapons systems procured by the Defense Department) to-
ward defense spending [Ref. 26, p. 130]. Korb argues that,
although large reductions have been made in Procurement and
RDT&E funding requests, few weapons systems have been can-
celled outright; that Congress may delay or stretch out a
program but that funds are invariably allocated. Hence,
Congressional orientation toward defense spending is more
fiscal (primarily concerned with the level of spending) than
programmatic [Ref. 29, p. 59]. While this discussion is not
necessarily germane to the subject of data selection it does
point out the different possible interpretations of avail-
able statistics on defense appropriations.
Comparison of the OSD data on changes to appropria-
tion categories for FYs 1960-1973 with the results of Strom-
berg's analysis for FYs 1953-1968 disclosed that there has
been little change in the distirbution of Congressional cuts
50

to the defense budget over the years. This fact plus the
5
criteria suggested by Fenno indicated that confining this
study to Procurement and RDT&E would reduce the amount of the
analysis but not impact on the significance of the results.
Selection of Procurement and RDT&E for study has an
additional benefit in that RDT&E represents funding for con-
ceptual weapons systems while Procurement includes funding
for programs that are directly related to identifiable mili-
tary hardware. Comparison of the relative fitting capability
of the decision models between RDT&E and Procurement should
provide some insight into differences in Congressional behav-
ior when considering identifiable and non-identifiable weap-
on systems.
2 . Data Sources
In order to empirically test the decision models
presented in Chapter III a data base that included the pre-
vious and current year's request and appropriation was needed
Data sources available included:
a. spread sheets used by the Senate Committee on
Armed Services (printed by the Committee) [Ref
.
12];
b. summary tables prepared by the Services in Hear-
ings before Senate and House Subcommittees on
Appropriations [Ref. 13];
5
As one standard of comparison, Fenno considered changes
of less than five percent to be insignificant in his survey




c. summary tables of the United States Budget for
Fiscal Years 1953-1973 [Ref. 38] and
d. tabulated data summaries included in Stromberg's
analysis of the Defense budget process, FYs 1953-
1968 [Ref. 36].
Utilizing the information available in these documents suf-
ficient data to test the hypothesized decision models were
compiled for all levels of aggregation. However, there were
some unexplained inconsistencies between sources. For ex-
ample, Stromberg's totals for PEMA (Procurement of Equipment
and Missiles - Army), PAMN (Procurement of Aircraft and Mis-
siles - Navy), and Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles -
Air Force were consistent with summaries provided in source
c but totals for DoD Procurement could not be reconciled
with the same document. This necessarily restricted analy-
sis of Procurement - Department of Defense to data provided
in Senate spread sheets (source a). Also, lack of spread
sheets for FY 1972 confined study of the program and program
element levels of aggregation to FY 1970 and 1971 (see sec-
tion V-B for definition of these levels of aggregation).
While these discrepancies posed certain analytical constraints
the remaining data does represent an accurate summary of re-




Study of the proposed decision models involved analysis




Level 1. Department of Defense - the aggregate sum of re-
quests and appropriations for all agencies within
the Defense Department, i.e., Army, Navy (includes
Marine Corps), Air Force, and Defense Agencies.
Level 2. Service - aggregate sums of requests and appropria-
tions for programs that make up Army, Navy (plus
Marine Corps) and Air Force RDT&E and Procurement.
7
Level 3. Program - aggregate sums of requests and appropri-
ations for program elements of a program within
Procurement and RDT&E for the individual services
(an example would be PExMA - Procurement of Equip-
ment and Missiles, Army).
q
Level 4. Program Element - amounts requested and appropri-
ated for the individual weapon systems andqrelated
activities that make up the Defense budget
.
Prior to regression analysis, plots were made of appro-
priations vs requests in order to pictorially view the valid-
ity of assuming linear models and further, to gain a general
idea of the impact of suppressing the constant term in the
models. These plots (see Figures 10 through 15 for RDT&E
See Figure 5 for an example of the different levels of
aggregation.
See Figures 6 and 7 for a
vestigated in this thesis.
listing of the programs in-
8
Figures 8 and 9 list those program elements studied.
Program elements for Procu
lated equipment were broken into
Items (QI) where quantities to b
with the request and Non-Quantit
specific weapon system or quanti
the requests - to investigate po
ior for these categories.
rement of aircraft and re-
two categories - Quantity
e purchased were included
y Items (NQI) for which no
ty could be identified with
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2. Aircraft and Related Equipment
3. Missiles and Related Equipment
4. Military Astronautics
5. Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment
6. Other Equipment
7. Programwide Management and Support
B NAVY
1. Military Sciences
2. Aircraft and Related Equipment
3. Missiles and Related Equipment
4. Military Astronautics
5. Ships and Small Craft Related Equipment
6. Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment
7. Other Equipment
8. Programwide Management and Support
C. AIR FORCE
1. Military Sciences
2. Aircraft and Related Equipment
3. Missiles and Related Equipment
4. Military Astronautics
5. Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment
6. Other Equipment














































































Adv. Aerial Fire Support System
Defense Communications Planning Group
Strategic Army Communications
Defense Research Sciences
Surface to Air Missile Development
Adv. Ballistic Missile Defense
Project Mallard
Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System
Missile Effectiveness Evaluation
Sea to Inland Logistics System
Infantry Support Weapons





Undersea Long-Range Missile System
S-3 Aircraft Development
Crane Helicopter Lift
Adv. Surface Missile System





Air Cargo Materials Handling







Aircraft Propulsion Subsystem Integration
Light Intratheater Transport
VTOL Engine Development
Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy
Conus Air Defense Interceptor
Adv. Ballistic Reentry System
Civil Engineering Technology
A-X Aircraft








64308F Short Range Air-to-Air Missile
64723F Adv. Airborne Command Post
65101F Rand
65102F Anser
65301F Western Test Range
65302F Eastern Test Range
65705F Lincoln Laboratory
65706F Mitre




Procurement Program Elements Included in Analysis
A. AIRCRAFT
Service Program Element Title
Army CH-47 Cargo Transport Helicopter
UH-1 Utility Transport Helicopter
AH-1 Armed Helicopter
OH-6/58 Observation Helicopter






Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts
Navy and A-4M Light Attack Skyhawk
Marine A-6A/E All Weather Attack Intruder
Corps A-6A/E Adv. Procurement, Current Year
EA-6B Electronic Warfare Intruder
EA-6B Adv. Procurement, Current Year
AV-8A VSTOL Harrier
AV-8A Adv. Procurement, Current Year
A-7E Medium Attack Corsair II
F-14A Fighter, Interceptor
F-14A Adv. Procurement, Current Year
UH-1N Utility Helicopter Iroquois
UH-1N Adv. Procurement, Current Year
P-3C ASW Aircraft, Orion
P-3C Adv. Procurement, Current Year
S-3A ASW Aircraft, Carrier Based
S-3A Adv. Procurement, Current Year
E-2C Early Warning Aircraft
E-2C Adv. Procurement, Current Year
T-2C Trainer Aircraft
TA-4J Trainer Aircraft
TA-4J Adv. Procurement, Current Year
Modification of Aircraft
Aircraft Spare and Repair Parts
Aircraft Component Improvement
Aircraft Industrial Facilities









































Designation assigned to Program Element; QI (Quantity Item), NQI
(Non-Quantity Item)
i
Author's code with which the reader may determine requests and




Service Program Element Title
Air Force A-7D Tactical Attack Fighter
A-7D Adv. Procurement, Current Year
F-4E Tactical Fighter
F-4E Adv. Procurement, Current Year
F/RF-5A/B Tactical Fighter
F-111D Adv. Tactical Fighter
F111D/F Fiscal Year 1969 and Prior Over Target
RF-4C Tactical Reconnaissance Fighter
RF-4C Adv. Procurement, Current Year











































and Figures 16 through 23 for Procurement at the end of this
chapter) reveal that the assumption of linearity and elimin-
ation of the constant term appear to be reasonable.
Close scrutiny of Figures 10 through 23 reveals two
points. First, comparing Figures 10 through 15 and 16 through
23 in sequential order (comparison on a descending level of
aggregation within categories) indicates that the data dis-
persion pattern appears to be more pronounced as the level
of aggregation is reduced; Procurement exhibiting this trend
more than RDT&E . Next, comparing RDT&E and Procurement
plots (see Figures 10 and 16; 11, 12, 13, and 17, 18, 19, 20;
14 and 21; 15 and 22, 23 at the end of this chapter) reveals
that data dispersion is more pronounced for Procurement than
RDT&E at similar levels of aggregation. One possible expla-
nation for this noted difference may be the types of requests
represented by Procurement (physical hardware) and RDT&E
(conceptual weapons systems).
Graphical analysis of the data via appropriation vs re-
quest plots does not allow for identification of point de-
partures from a trend or changes in a trend over a period of
years. For this reason the time-series data for DoD and
Service levels of aggregation (levels 1 and 2) were plotted
according to the percentage of request appropriated (appro-
priation/request) vs time. These plots are included as Fig-
ures 24 through 32.
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Viewing the data in this manner indicates that the per-
centage of request appropriated was more stable for the
period FYs 1963-1973 than for FYs 1953-1962. These figures
also point out the more favorable funding increments realized
in the earlier period. Sapolsky [Ref. 34, p. 160-173] at-
tributes these higher funding increments to the numerous
strategic programs initiated in the 1950' s.
The final step in the testing process consisted of apply-
ing the Mann-Whitney test to the time-series data for DoD
and the Services in an effort to determine homogeneity with-
in the samples. Based on military policy differences between
Eisenhower's "massive retaliation", Kennedy and Johnson's
"flexible response", and Nixon's "balance of power" doctrines
the data were divided into three subgroups; FYs 1953-1959,
FYs 1960-1969, and FYs 1970-1973. 13" The following is a
Percent of request appropriated is somewhat misleading
unless the amount requested is also considered. For example,
in FY 1955 the Navy requested 61.0 million dollars for RDT&E.
Congress responded by appropriating 419.88 million dollars
or 688% of request. In FY 1956 the Navy reacting to an ob-
viously favorable funding climate, requested and received
439.2 million dollars for RDT&E.
Other dates of interest tested were FY 1961 - to in-
vestigate the impact of the newly formed Congressional
Authorization Committees; and FY 1963 - to determine if the
introduction of PPBS into the defense resource planning
process had significant impact on the stream of appropria-
tions. No statistical differences in the data were noted
for these dates. Possible explanations for this result may
be that the more controversial requests were not included in
the main budget submission but were included in supplemental
requests and thereby bypassed the normal authorization proc-
ess or that they were "buried" in aggregate requests until
the project had gained sufficient momentum and was difficult
to cancel (the Cheyenne helicopter is a good example of the
latter). Also, PPBS is a DoD resource planning guide and,
as such, may not have much influence on the Congress.
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summary of the results obtained and represents final group-
ing of the data upon which linear regression analyses were
made. Numerical results for the Mann-Whitney tests are in-
cluded as Appendix A.
1. RDT&E
a. Department of Defense
FYs 1953-1959 not statistically different from
FYs 1960-1969; FYs 1970-1973 statistically different from
FYs 1953-1969.
final grouping - FYs 1953-1969 and FYs 1970-1973.
b. Services
(1) Army . same as DoD.
final grouping - FYs 1953-1969 and FYs 1970-1973.
(2) Navy . FYs 1953-1969 not statistically dif-
ferent from FYs 1970-1973.
final grouping - FYs 1953-1973.
(3) Air Force . same as DoD.
final grouping - FYs 1953-1969 and FYs 1970-1973.
(4) Services Pooled (FYs 1970-1973) . 12 the hy-
pothesis of a single population could not be rejected. Army,
Navy, and Air Force RDT&E may be combined into a single sam-
ple.
12 Fiscal Years 1970-1973 for all services were combined






a. Department of Defense
FYs 1964-1969 not statistically different from
FYs 1970-1973.
final grouping - FYs 1964-1973.
b. Services
(1) Procurement Equipment and Missiles - Army .
FYs 1953-1969 statistically different from FYs
1970-1973.
final grouping - FYs 1953-1969 and FYs 1970-1973
(2) Procurement Aircraft and Missiles - Navy .
FYs 1953-1969, FYs 1960-1969, and FYs 1970-1973
statistically different.
final grouping - FYs 1953-1959, FYs 1960-1969,
and FYs 1970-1973.
(3) Procurement Missiles - Air Force . FYs 1953-
1969 statistically different from FYs 1970-1973.
final grouping - FYs 1953-1969 and FYs 1970-1973
(4) Procurement Aircraft - Air Force . FYs 1953-
1969 statistically different from FYs 1970-1973.
final grouping - FYs 1953-1969 and FYs 1970-1973
(5) Services Pooled - FYs 1970-1973 . the hy-
pothesis of a single population could not be rejected. Pro-
curement Equipment and Missiles - Army, Procurement Aircraft
13
Data for FYs 1953-1963 were not available for DoD




and Missiles - Navy, Procurement Missiles - Air Force, and
Procurement Aircraft - Air Force may be combined into a
single sample.
This grouping of the data allowed for testing the postu-
lated decision models at the four levels of aggregation pre-
viously defined for RDT&E and Procurement. Chapter VI
outlines the methods used and significant results are evalu-
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Figure 17. Appropriations vs Requests - Army Procurement
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Figure 18. Appropriations vs Requests - Navy Procurement
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Figure 21. Appropriations vs Requests - Program:
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Figure 22. Appropriations vs Requests - Quantity Items,
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Figure 23. Appropriations vs Requests - Non-Quantity Items,
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Figure 29. Percent of Request Appropriated vs Time - Procure-
ment Equipment and Missiles, Army: FYs 1953-1973
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Multiple linear regression analysis was used to test the
postulated decision rules using the data groupings delineated
by the Mann-Whitney tests. Two of the groupings were not
investigated — DoD RDT&E for FYs 1970-1973 and Procurement
Aircraft and Missiles Navy — due to insufficient sample
sizes, four and seven observations, respectively. To per-
form the regression analysis the BIOMED series of statisti-
cal programs on multiple and step-wire linear regression was
chosen. When the BIOMED programs are used under the assump-
tion of a zero intercept all variances, covariances, stand-
ard deviations, and correlations are computed about the
origin vice the regression line. The consequences of such a
computational procedure have been outlined in Chapter III
and, as such, were considered when selecting those models
that best describe the defense budgetary process.
As they appeared in their structural form the models were
Model Rl X + = 3 Y + 1 +e +_t o t— 1 t







t. 1+3 i (Tt_ 1-Xt.1 )+e t




Model A3 Y + = a X +a (X -g Y + - )+e 4.t 3 t «f t t-1 t
Model A4 Y = a 5 X t+a 6 ( xt
-x





where: X = funding request for year t
X.- = funding request for year t-1
Y. = appropriation for year t
Y
1
= appropriation for year t-1
£ = stochastic error term
In this form all models except A2 and A3 were compatible
with linear regression format. For A2 the following trans-
formation of variable was necessary:
Y
t






where a' = c^xo^
The estimated coefficients (a
l
and &
2 ) are consistent in a
statistical sense and unbiased but may be unstable (vary





highly correlated [Ref. 25, p. 159-168].
For model A3 the variable (X.-3 Y
1
) was estimated by
















Johnston [Ref. 24, p. 376-380] has pointed out that a 3 and
^ will be unbiased, maximum-likelihood estimates of a 3 and
&
k
if e (Rl) is normally distributed.
These models (Rl, R2 , R3, Al, A2*, A3*, and A4) were
applied to the data; the results of which are included in
Appendix B, Tables I through VII for RDT&E and VIII through
XVII for Procurement. In the case of A2* the coefficients
have been transformed back into their structural form.
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Of primary importance in deciding which model best fits
the data is the impact of suppressing the constant term.
1 YFor this end, e = — . L ~ e. (where e. is the difference be-
' n i=l 1 l
tween the i actual and estimated request or appropriation)
was computed for each model. For linear models with a con-
n
stant term .£ e. will be zero. For the suppressed constant
n
x x
models .£., e. will be zero if and only if the data falls ini=l i J
a symmetric pattern about the regression line. Other rele-
vant statistics considered were coefficient of variation
(CV) and standard error (SE).
Once the more representative models had been identified
the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients
was tested using the two-sided "t" test at the 0.05 level of
significance. Those coefficients annotated by an asterisk
(*) in Tables I through XVII were not found to be statisti-
cally significant, that is, it was not possible to reject
the hypothesis that the coefficient was equal to zero.
Application of the above criteria made possible the se-
lection of the following models as being most representative
of the defense budgetary process.
A . RDT&E
Level 1 - Department of Defense FYs 1953-1969
sample size (SS) = 17
X,. = 1.041Y + -+0.974CY,. .,-X, 1 )
14
+e 4_; CV = 0.063t t-1 t-1 z-1 t
(8.376) (2.156)
14 The number in parentheses below each coefficient is
the computed "t" statistic for that coefficient.
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Y+ = 1.011X +e • CV = 0.084t t t
(7.497)
Level 2 - Services





; CV = 0.152
(5.507)
Y = 0.984X +e ; CV = 0.050
(9.397)
2. Navy FYs 1953-1973 SS = 21






; CV = 0.101
(6.434)
3. Air Force FYs 1953-1969 SS = 17
X^ = 0.998Y^. «+] .031(Y .-X. .)+£.; CV = 0.08
t t-1 t-1 x-jl x
(7.197) (2.540)
Y = 1.021X +£ ; CV = 0.134
(6.072)
4. Services Pool (Army, Navy and Air Force)
FYs 1970-1973 SS = 12
X
t




+e ; CV = 0.054
(7.849)
Level 3 - Program FYs 1970-1971 SS = 43








; CV = 0.062
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Level 4 - Program Element FYs 1970-1971 SS = 52
X+ = 0.934Y^ +1.37(Y + .-X+ -) + £,.; CV = 0.572t t-1 t-1 t-1 t
(4.312) (3.826)
Y = 1.018X +e ; CV = 0.293
(4.884)
B . PROCUREMENT
Level 1 - Department of Defense FYs 1964-1973 SS = 10







; CV = 0.106
(5.049)
Level 2 - Services
1. Army (PEMA) FYs 1959-1969 SS = 11
X, = 1.111Y,.
-+E,.; CV = 0.395






; CV = 0.119
(5.394)




t _ 1+e t
; CV = 0.221
(3.730)
Y = 0.999X +£ ; CV = 0.160
SS = 17
(4 492)

































= 0.978X +e ; CV = 0.155
(5.046)
5. Services Pooled (PEMA, PAMN, AF A/C & MISS)





; CV = 0.176
(4.911)
Y = 0.899X +e ; CV = 0.060
(7.196)
Level 3 - Program FYs 1970-1971 SS = 23
X
t
= 0.883Y ^e ; CV = 0.222
(4.029)
Y. - 0.927X+ -i£ • CV = 0.079
u t t
(6.971)
Level 4 - Program Element FYs 1970-1972











+e ; CV = 0.225
(5.835)
2. Quantity Items SS = 27









3. Non-Quantity Items SS = 36
X = 0.797Y
1
+e ; CV = 0.372
(3.153)
Y = 0.990X +e ; CV = 0.041
(10.674)
Viewing the results en masse makes it difficult to gain
insight into the Congressional-DoD budgetary process. How-
ever, when examined in light of some specific hypotheses
several interesting points surface.
HYPOTHESIS: THE DEFENSE APPROPRIATION PROCESS MAY BE MODELLED
BY SIMPLE (BASICALLY INCREMENTAL) DECISION RULES
Based on their studies of Congressional behavior and em-
pirical results for the non-defense budgetary process Davis,
Dempster, and Wildavsky believed that their models were
equally applicable to the defense appropriations process.
This hypothesis is supported by the results of this thesis
for certain levels of aggregation. Of the thirty-four models
judged as being most appropriate for the data, thirty-one
include only one decision variable. More interesting, how-
ever, is the result that the three more complex models are
agency request models and in each case a - the estimated
appropriation coefficient - was greater than 1.0. These
were the only cases in which this result was realized.
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HYPOTHESIS: SIMPLE LINEAR MODELS ARE NOT VALID FOR THE LOWER
LEVELS OF AGGREGATION
One of the criticisms of the Davis, Dempster, and Wildav-
sky study was that they should have examined object of ex-
penditure classes or some other lower level of aggregation
rather than full agency request and subsequent Congressional
appropriations. This criticism appears to stem from the be-
lief that aggregation tends to mask Congressional activity
and that simple models may not be valid at the lower levels
of aggregation.
The empirical results of this study support this belief.
15
If one uses 0.20 coefficient of variation as the upper lim-
it on a model's fitting capability then the following obser-
vations can be made:
1. simple request models are not adequate for the Pro-
gram level of aggregation and below for RDT&E and
Service level and below for Procurement;
2. simple appropriation models do not adequately fit
the data for the Program Element level of aggrega-
tion; and
3. simple decision models have better fitting capabil-
ity for RDT&E than Procurement for all levels of
aggregation.
15
"Although the question of reliability of an estimating
equation is relative to the context in which the equation is
to be used, a value of at least as small as 10 to 20 percent
for coefficient of variation is desirable" [Ref. 33, p. 44].
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HYPOTHESIS: THE USE OF INCREMENTAL DECISION RULES IS RELATED
TO WEAPON SYSTEM VISIBILITY
In their studies of organizational behavior Cyert and
March found that organizations attempted to reduce uncertain-
ty by relying more on short-run reaction to feedback from
the environment and less on long-range planning [Ref. 10,
p. 6]. For the Congress and Defense Department uncertainty
may manifest itself in weapon system visibility; that is,
the more directly linked a proposed expenditure and a spe-
cific weapon system are the less uncertain the benefit of
that expenditure. If this hypothesis is true then there
should be an inverse relationship between weapon system
visibility and coefficient of variation (a measure of model
fit).
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to assume that a weapon
system is more visible to the Department of Defense than the
Congress regardless of the stage of development. Formula-
tion of the Defense budget involves conducting a series of
cost-benefit analyses — the objective of which is to deter-
mine the most capable mix of weaponry for the lowest total
cost. The technical nature of these studies is of assistance
to the services but of little use to the smaller, less tech-
nically oriented Congressional appropriation subcommittees.
Visibility of a weapon system is also a function of the
funding source within the Defense budget. Research, Devel-
opment, Test and Evaluation funds support those activities
that develop and test conceptual systems whereas Procurement
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represents the acquisition of physical hardware. Therefore,
in terms of weapon system visibility, Procurement should in-
volve less uncertainty than RDT&E
.
Finally, the ability to relate a proposed expenditure to
a specific weapon system may be a function of the request
itself. For example, consider the Army's request for $38. 6M
for Modification of Aircraft (FY 1971). For the Army's
planning group this request represents modification of a
given number and type of aircraft. It also may include con-
tingencies for schedule and material problems; information
not readily available to the appropriation committees unless
requested. On the other hand, the Army's request for $41. 6M
for 24 CH-47 Cargo Transport Helicopters identifies the type
and unit cost. This type of information allows the appro-
priation committees to weigh possible alternatives and to
determine to some degree the cost-effectiveness of each unit
being requested. Thus in terms of relative visibility, it
seems plausible to suggest that the uncertainty surrounding
non-quantity/type requests should be greater than for quan-
tity/type equipment identified requests.
To test the relationship between relative visibility of
a weapon system and model fit the coefficient of variation
(CV) for agency request and Congressional appropriation mod-
els for Level 3 (Programs) and Level 4 (Program Elements)
were ranked according to the previously identified levels of
visibility. Level 4 - Procurement was divided into two
groups; Quantity Items (those requests that included
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quantity/type information) and Non-Quantity Items (no quan-
tity/type information provided with the requests). Figure
33 includes the results of this ordering of model fit.
From Figure 33 it may be concluded that weapon system
visibility does have considerable impact upon model fit.
Empirical differences in the coefficient of variation for
Congressional and agency consideration of the Defense budget
at aggregation levels 3 and 4 and Procurement Non-Quantity/
Quantity items are consistent with hypothesized results.
However, realized differences between RDT&E and Procurement
do not conform to hypothesized behavior. In fact, no pat-
tern in coefficient of variation is evident and, therefore,
no definite conclusions can be drawn.
C. OTHER TESTS
1. Inflation
Using agency request data as indicative of needs
tacitly assumes that inflation has somehow been accounted
for. However, a review of available Congressional records
and appropriation literature failed to reveal any discussion
of the topic of inflation. This omission plus the generally
poor fit for agency request models prompted an adjustment of
the data to determine if a better fit could be realized.
To this end, data for Model Al, Navy RDT&E was ad-
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a. CV £ 0.20 is considered an acceptable model fit
b. The Quantity Item request model coefficient




X. [inflation factor for year t] = $ Y
1
[ inflation factor
for year t-1] +e
where
the inflation factor for year t = 1/price indice for
year t
Regression analysis using this model resulted in
X
t
= 1.075Y +e CV = 0.083
(7.627) SE = 88.392
Comparing this with the unadjusted results of
X = 1.084Y +e CV = 0.086
(7.491) SE = 87.313
indicated that there was little improvement in model fit.
Similar adjustment of Procurement and the data for lower
levels of aggregation were equally insignificant.
2. Base Model Concep t
Wildavsky noted that appropriation committee members
tended to restrict their review of agency budgets to that
increment over and above a base or core program [Ref. 41,
p. 64-68]. Since none of the Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky
models directly attempt to measure this type of behavior a





+a 2 (Xt-a 1 )+e t (A5)
was applied to several data sets. In the above model coef-
ficient a
x
represents the base or core program exempt from
Congressional review and is assumed to be fixed over time.
"1 c





Pay and Price Indices/Inflation Factors;
Procurement and RDT&E
Fiscal Pay and Price Indice, Inflation






















Source: Department of the Navy Programming Manual
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This assumption may not be valid except for small "snapshots"
of time. Also, there exists the possibility of a negative
base which is unrealistic but may be used as a means of
evaluating model validity. On the other hand, model A5 pro-
vides for an additional degree of freedom in the regression
and should realize a smaller standard error of estimate.
As a basis for comparative analysis Model A5 was
applied to Levels 1 and 2 for RDT&E and compared with the
results for those models deemed most descriptive of that
















SE = 297.123 CV - 0.073 R 2 = 0.985 W 2 = 1.00
U
B
= 0.00% UM = 0.40% UR = 99.60%
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.367 (cannot reject the hy-
pothesis of no first order autocorrelation)







SE = 45.665 CV = 0.050 R 2 = 0.991 W 2 = 0.998






= 192. 867+0. 970(X
t-192.867)+e t
SE = 52.976 CV = 0.054 R 2 = 0.998 W 2 = 1.00
U = 0.00% U„ = 0.29% UD = 99.71%B MR
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.133 (test results for first
order autocorrelation are inconclusive).
NAVY
Model Al
Y+ = 0.999X +£.,.t t t
SE = 109.110 CV = 0.101 R2 = 0.968 W2 = 0.991









SE = 89.550 CV = 0.080 R 2 = 0.978 Y/2 =1.00
UD = 0.00% U„ = 0.56% UD = 99.44%B MR
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.58 (the hypothesis that







SE = 241.283 CV = 0.134 R 2 = 0.967 V/2 = 0.989
U„ = 3.54% U„ = 3.20% UD = 93.26%B MR
Model A5
Y+ = 5927. 361+0. 975(X -5927 . 361)+e ,t t t t
SE = 229.007 CV = 0.115 R2 = 0.969 W2 =1.00
U„ = 0.00% U., = 0.78% UD = 99.22%d M K
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Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.284 (test results for first
order autocorrelation are inconclusive).
Of the above examples, only Army and Navy RDT&E have
what may be considered a realistic constant (base program).
For DoD and Air Force the large constant term ($7,155M and
$5,927M, respectively) implies that (X - base program) is
negative (i.e., the Congress reviews a negative request for
DoD and Air Force RDT&E) which is unrealistic. In these
cases the base model does not make sense and possibly indi-
cates that too long a time period was included in the re-
gression. In all cases model fit is comparable to that of
the incremental models. Also, while a similar base model
was not investigated for agency requests there is no reason
to believe that this could not be done. Further research in
this area is warranted and should include developing models
for separate eras or models with which changes in the base
program(s) may be estimated.
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VII. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS AND AREAS SUGGESTED
FOR FURTHER STUDY
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS
The word "model" has several shades of meaning, all of
which are dependent upon the entity being investigated. In
the context of this thesis "model" has been used as a substi-
ture representation of reality, formulated to capture the
crux of a complex decision making process but sufficiently
free of burdensome detail to enhance understanding. To this
end, the tested models (decision rules) have at least par-
tially explained the behavior oi Congress in the DoD budg-
etary process. This qualified judgment as to the adequacy
of empirical results is predicated on the adequacy of (1)
using a linear model to describe Congressional behavior; (2)
fitting techniques, based on the use of least-square regres-
sion; and (3) determination of a suitable criterion for
measuring model goodness of fit. The degree to which each
of these areas impact upon study assumptions affects the
relevance of empirical results.
1. Linear Models and Congressional Behavior
The concept of simple, predictive decision rules has
its origin in sociological theory of bureaucratic organiza-
tions [Refs. 10, 30, 32]. Combining theory and observed be-
havior Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky (DD&W) postulated and
tested a series of models (representing simple decision
rules) that are strikingly simple -- to the point of being
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unrealistic — yet fit the non-defense appropriation budg-
etary process very well.
DD&W found that model Al (using current year request
to explain current year appropriation) realized the best
fit; a result that was also noted in this study.
More interesting is the effects of aggregation upon
model fit; a point not investigated by DD&W or others. As
an illustration, consider the empirical results obtained for
the period FYs 1970-1971 — a period short enough to preclude
any drastic changes in Congressional behavior:
T t -r a 4. • ** ^ ^ CoefficientLevel of Aggregation Model ~ TT ...&&—& of Variation
Service Level (Pooled) Y, =0. 9306X +e
.
0.054











Program Level Y =0.9678X +e 0.064
Program Element Leval Y =1.0183X +z 0.293
Service Level (Pooled) Y =0.89869X.+e 0.060
Program Level Y =0 . 92744X„. + e. 0.079to t t t
Program Element Level
Quantity Items Y.+0.96248X +e 0.304
Non-Quantity Items Y +0.99046X +e 0.041
Comparing realized model fit (coefficient of variation)
against an upper bound of 0.20 it is evident that the simple
model is appropriate for the Program Level of aggregation
and above but not for the lowest level of the defense budget
the program element. This anomaly in the results is diffi-
cult to explain in light of the fact that program request
and appropriation totals are merely the sum of program ele-
ment requests and appropriations.
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As one means of explaining Committee behavior in
light of the empirical resu_.j consider the following scena-
rio. Suppose that in the process of balancing the federal
budget, the Congress decides to cut the defense budget by
"X"%. This total reduction is then distributed among the
individual service requests. Allocation of a percentage cut
to the services is accomplished via plus and minus reductions
in program requests — again on a percentage basis. Once
the magnitude of cut for a particular program has been de-
termined the individual program elements are acted upon in
light of information accompaning the requests and/or gained
through committee hearings — with continual comparison of
the sum already cut from the program and the total cut to be
made. If, after all of the more visible/controversial pro-
gram elements have been acted upon, there remains an addi-
tional amount to be cut from the program then those elements
that are of minor importance or have less visibility are cut
on a percentage basis.
Committee members' statements, prior research, and
the results of this study lend support to the appropriate-
ness of this scenario. First, witness a committee member's
views of a submitted budget —
"There isn't a budget that can't be cut ten
percent immediately." [Ref. 19, p. 311];




"Frequently the (subcommittee) chairman has a
figure which he states. Sometimes he will have
no figure, and he'll turn to me and say, '
,
what do you think?' Maybe I'll have a figure.
It's very flexible." [Ref. 19, p. 319] .
Next, consideration of a portion of the budget by a specific
group of subcommittee members is consistent with the commit-
tee norm of specialization — consideration of the budget on
an area of interest/expertise basis to insure familiarity
with all of the relevant facts [Ref. 11, p. 535] . Finally,
the empirical results of this study (and others) support
such a scenario. The fact that there is stability in model
fit up to and including the program level of aggregation
followed by a jump (by a factor of five) in coefficient of
variation strongly suggests a change in the method of deter-
mining funding levels. Also, the extreme differences in
model fit between Quantity Items and Non-Quantity Items —
where determination of the type request was made on the
basis of spread sheet information (the same sheets used by
the subcommittee) — speaks for itself.
Without access to committee markup sessions the ac-
curacy of the above scenario cannot be verified. Further
study in this area is warranted but will require information
currently not available to the public.
2. Least-Squares Estimation Techniques
Use of least-squares estimation techniques assumes
no interdependence between either the coef f icient (s) being
estimated and the independent variable(s) or between the in-
dependent variable(s) and the error term. These are
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assumptions that may not always be valid. For example, if
the Congress is using a percentage appropriation decision
rule, it may be the case that the percentage changes when a
request is considered exorbitant or inadequate in light of
an evolving international crisis; Navy-RDT&E for FY 1955
being an example of the latter (Request - $61. OM, Appropria-
tion - $419. 9M). Model A2 was designed to account for such
behavior; the results of which were judged insignificant
mainly due to small sample sizes with relatively few major
deviations from the norm. As such, these major deviations
remain unaccounted for. More significant is the effect that
these outliers have upon the estimated appropriation coeffi-






The circled observation may be a genuine outlier in
that the Congress, in response to a critical international
crisis, appropriated an amount in excess of the normal per-
centage (similar to that observed for FY 1955 Navy RDT&E).
Because least-squares attempts to minimize the squared de-
viations from the regression line the fitted curve (solid
line) will be rotated counterclockwise (dashed line). As
such, the estimate of the coefficient will be somewhat con-
taminated by the single outlier. Deleting the outlier(s) is
one possible means of resolving this problem but then the
question becomes one of determining which observations are
outliers and which belong in the analysis.
Another more basic problem is that, since the regres-
sion line is forced through the origin and negative requests
(appropriations) are not possible, there is a certain lack
of homogeneity of variance built into the DD&W models. The
most promising solution to this problem appears to be the
fixed base model. An alternative solution may be to employ
a different regression methodology such as that suggested by
Capra in his Doctoral thesis [Ref. 2].
3. Determination of Model Fit
Prior analyses have used coefficient of determina-
tion (R 2 ) as a means of judging model fit to budget data.
There are two major problems with using this criterion; one
being associated with computing R 2 for the DD&W models while
the other is peculiar to the subject matter being investi-




A more basic problem has been revealed by Capra
[Ref. 2] and is associated with the usefulness of R 2 as a
tool for analyzing budget models similar to those suggested







which states that, on the average, the Congress appropriates
a percentage (6) of the request. There is no difference be-
tween this and
(2) (Xt-Yt ) = cxt+n t
which states that, on the average, the Congress cuts a cer-
tain percentage (C) of the request. In fact, if (1) is the
correct model, then 3 should equal (1-C) and e. should equal
n. since
(X -Y ) = CX +n t implies that
Y
t
= d-C)xt+n t = BXt+c t
Theoretically one should be able to test either model and
obtain similar results. In reality such is not always the
case. In preliminary tests, a data sample that yielded
W2 =0.98 for model (1) resulted in W 2 =0.23 for model (2).
The problem is that R 2 or W 2 should be considered in a prob-
abilistic context (which is possible -- but hasn't been done
for DD&W models).
As a surrogate measure of model fit coefficient of
variation has been used throughout this analysis; primarily
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due to its robustness to distributional assumptions of the
error terms and deletion (inclusion) of a constant term in
the regression equation. As such, CV is a reliable indica-
tor of model fit. For the same data in which W 2 varied from
0.98 to 0.23 CV remained at 0.103 for both regressions.
B. AREAS SUGGESTED FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cross-sectional and time-series regression analyses have
been used to investigate the applicability of the Davis,
Dempster, and Wildavsky models to the Defense budgetary
process. The following is a summary of the areas that the
author feels needs to be investigated further.
1) The DD&W models appear to be valid for the Defense
budgetary process at the higher levels of aggregation.
Specifically, simple request decision rules achieved an
acceptable fit to the data down to the Service level of
aggregation and simple appropriation decision rules fit the
data down to the Program level. Neither fit the lowest
level of aggregation of the Defense budget — the Program
Element. This anomaly remains to be explained.
2) The DD&W models were unable to account for major de-
viations in the stream of requests or appropriations. Em-
pirical results for the autoregressive model A2 were
insignificant mainly due to samll sample sizes. Therefore,
since least squares estimation was used, those data sets
that contain major deviations probably tend to overestimate
or underestimate the true percentage appropriated. Further
in

study of committee behavioi ' > necessary to determine why
iff" s
and when such deviations occur'.
3) The applicability of simple decision models appears
to be a function of weapon system visibility, that is, as a
weapon system and proposed expenditure become more directly
linked a simple decision model of the kind investigated here
becomes less appropriate. This result was noted by examining
differences in model fit between agency requests and Con-
gressional reaction to those requests and by comparing re-
quests (appropriations) that included equipment type/quantity
with requests (appropriations) it are of a more general
(or non-quantity) nature at the Program Element level of
aggregation for Procurement. This result may appear to en-
courage reduced system visibility by defense agencies to
ensure predictable funding. Such is not the case. All that
is implied is that a decision rule other than a percentage
of request rule appears to be used for the more visible
weapon systems. Further study as to why the Congress tends
to employ different decision rules is necessary before
definitive conclusions can be made in this area.
4) Finally, questions have been raised about the valid-
ity of a model's statistical properties and test results
when using linear models with a suppressed constant term. A
survey of available theory on linear regression analysis re-
vealed that few textbooks addressed the subject explicitly
and those that did approached the topic in general terms.
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Further research in this area is required to establish the





RESULTS OF MANN-WHITNEY TESTS FOR DATA HOMOGENEITY
The Mann-Whitney U Test was used to test the periods
FYs 1953-1959, FYs 1960-1969, and FYs 1970-1973. Under the
null hypothesis the data subsets are drawn from the same
population (H :G(X) = F(X)). To test this hypothesis the
sample observations are pooled and ranked according to in-
creasing size. The value of the U-statistic is computed as
follows
:
T = S-(ni)(ni+l)/2 (See Chapter III-B-2 for
definition of terms)
If T is less than or eaual to U, N where a is the de-
(, n i , n 2 , a
;
sired significance level then the null hypothesis (H ) is
rejected.
To account for the three subsets, FYs 1953-1959 and FYs
1960-1969 were first compared. Then, based on this outcome
FYs 1970-1973 was tested against FYs 1953-1969 (H is not re-
jected) or FYs 1960-1969 (H rejected). From these tests
the following numerical results were realized.
RDT&E
Department of Defense
a. FYs 1953-1959 vs FYs 1960-1969
T = 28.0 U, N = 22.0 (H cannot be
( 7 >10,.10) • 4.JNv
' '
' rejected)
b. FYs 1953-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973
T = 15.0 U,
s





a. FYs 1953-1959 vs FYs 1960-1969
T = 29.0 U,
7 1Q 1Q v
= 22.0 (Ho cannot be
* ' ' '
' rejected)
b. FYs 1953-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973
T = 5.0 U, v = 19.0 (reject H )(« ,17 , .10 )
Navy
a. FYs 1953-1969 vs FYs 1960-1969
T = 30.0 U,„
. , . .
x - 22.0 (Ho cannot be
rejected)(7 , i o , . 1 o )
b. FYs 1953-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973





a. FYs 1953-1959 vs FYs 1960-1969
T = 24.0 U, v = 22.0 (H cannot be
(7
'
10 " lo) rejected)
b. FYs 1953-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973
T = 18.0 U, N = 19 (reject H )
Services Pooled FYs 1970-1973
a. Army vs Navy
T = 5.0 U, v = 4.0 (H cannot be(l,,I"- lo) rejected)
b. Army and Navy vs Air Force
T = 10.0 U. . = 8.0 (H cannot be







1. Department of Defense
a. FYs 1964-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973
T = 7.0 U, x = 6.0 (H cannot be
' ' ' rejected)
2. Services
Army-PEMA
a. FYs 1953-1959 vs FYs 1960-1969
T = 30.0 U,
,
= 7.017 (H cannot be(3, 10, .10) VU . . ,,v
' '
y rejected)
b. FYs 1953-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973
T = 4.0 U, v = 16 (reject H )
Navy-PAMN
a. FYs 1953-1959 vs FYs 1960-1969
T = 12 U, v = 22.0 (reject H )(7 , 1 , . 1 )
b. FYs 1960-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973
T = 8.0 U, v = 11.0 (reject H )
( « , 1 o , . 1 o )
v ° u/
Air Force-Aircraft
a. FYs 1953-1959 vs FYs 1960-1969




b. FYs 1953-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973




. 1 o )
17 Data for FYs 1955-1958 missing. As a result the peri-




a. FYs 1953-1959 vs FYs 1960-1969
T = 24.0 U, v = 22.0 (H cannot be
( 7 , 1 , . 1 ) . J.JXv
'
' ' rejected)
b. FYs 1953-1969 vs FYs 1970-1973




, . 1 )
v ° u
Services Pooled FYs 1970-1973
a. Air Force Aircraft vs Air Force Missiles
T = 6.0 U, v = 4.0 (H cannot be
(lt '"" lo) rejected)
b. Air Force Aircraft & Missiles vs Army PEMA




c. Air Force Aircraft & Missiles, Army PEMA vs Navy
PAMN
T = 18.0 U,
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POD PROCUREMENT ($ Millions)













































































Service Fiscal Year Request Appropriation
1961 2,114.9 2,144.1
1962 2, 000.0 2, 680.9
1963 3, 065.0 3, 834.7
1964 3, 066.0 2, 889.1
1965 2, 515.8 2, 496.3
1966 2, 279.8 2, 272.5
1967 1, 789.9 1, 789.9
1968 3; 046.0 2, 939.1
1969 3 222.0 2, 574.3
1970 3 235.0 2; 620.0
1971 3 427.7 3, 117.9
1972 4 069.1 3. 955.0
1973 4 118.6 3, 696.3
Air Force - 1953 8 205.6 8 048.0
Aircraft 1954 4 283.0 2 453.7
1955 2 098.8 2 072.4
1956 4 031.0 4 128.8
1957 3 859.9 4 ,533.1
1958 4 122.9 3 ,914.9
1959 4 012.8 4 ,288.4
1960 4 322.8 4 ,284.6
1961 2 ,934.1 3 ,497.2
1962 3 136.2 3 ,537.2
1963 3 ,135.0 3 ,562.4
1964 3 ,559.0 3 ,385.6
1965 3 ,663.0 3 ,563.7
1966 3 ,550.2 3 ,517.0
1967 3 ,961.3 4 ,017.3
1968 5 ,582.0 5 ,493.4
1969 4 ,612.0 3 ,860.0
1970 3 ,775.2 3 ,405.8
1971 3 ,314.9 3 ,219.3
1972 3 ,116.5 2 ,942.3
1973 3 ,255.7 2 ,682.3
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Service Fiscal Year Request Appropriation
Air Force - 1953 3,012.1 2,903.8






















PROCUREMENT - PROGRAMS ($ Millions)
FY 1970 Fi: 1971





Navy & Marine . Corps 2,409.2 1,826.2 2,487.7 2,126.5
Air Force 3,775.2 3,405.8 3,314.9 3,219.3
MISSILES
Army 957.7 831.9 1,094.6 983.8
Navy 851.3 818.8 983.0 905.5
Air Force 1,486.4 1,448.1 1,530.6 1,427.2
Marine Corps 20.1 3.4 27.6 12.8
TRACKED COMBAT VEHCILES
Army 305.8 201.1 207.2 197.5
Marine Corps 37.7 37.7 48.7 47.4
NEW SKIP CONSTRUCTION
Navy 1,945.5 1,912.3 2,578.9 2,465.4
OTHER WEAPONS
Army * * 68.2 62.0
Navy * A 2.8 2.8
Marine Corps * * 4.4 4.4
* New Program Beginning FY 71
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PROGRAM ELEMENTS - PROCUREMENT ($ Millions)
FY 1970 FY 1971
P.E. REQT APPR REQT APPR TYPE P.E
0101 56.3 56.3 41.6 26.6 QI
0102 49.2 49.2 37.9 29.6 Ql
0103 0.0 86.0 37.0 32.6 QI
0104 68.4 68.4 64.2 62.0 Ql
0106 69.5 65.1 38.6 37.2 NQI
0110 8.2 11.6 9.2 5.3 NQI
0111 227.4 160.7 50.6 48.3 NQI
0206 42.3 42.3 96.2 64.0 QI
0215 0.0 0.0 79.0 0.0 Ql
0217 0.0 0.0 92.3 0.0 QI
0218 0.0 0.0 20.0 43.0 NQI
0222 325.9 327.6 255.9 248.8 NQI
0223 568.5 495.6 447.4 453.0 NQI
0305 11.2 11.2 10. 3 9.2 QI
0306 599.8 566.0 283.0 283.0 QI
0307 71.4 74.4 200.5 200.5 NQI
0309 8.0 5.9 4.5 4.5 NQI
0314 28.1 6.6 39.3 39.3 Ql
0315 53.7 53.7 46.6 41.6 Ql
0317 550.2 506.7 537.4 526.4 NQI
0320 42.0 40.0 32.0 32.0 NQI
0321 38.5 35.5 27.5 27.5 NQI
0323 101.3 91.3 92.1 92.1 NQI
CODE:
01=Army, 02-Navy , 03=Air Force
Example: 0101 = Army, Program Element 01
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POD RDT&E ($ Millions)
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Service Fiscal Year ; v/St Appropriation

























Service Fiscal Year Request Appropriation
























Service Fiscal Year Request Appropriation


























PROGRAMS RDT&E ($ Millions)
Service Program
FY 1970 FY 1971




127.1 71.5 110.2 106.2
914.9 897.4 896.4 869.0
14.0 10.0 10.7 8.5
193.1 163.0 153.2 144.9
130.7 130.7 317.8 297.8
54.1 48.1 52.3 52.3
160.1 139.8 142.2 135.3
577.3 799.7 694.0 735.8
564.6 459.3 494.3 484.6
1 O 7 29.1 28.1
345.2 291.5 377.5 350.2
109.1 95.8 89.0 89.0
280.0 252.9 226.7 223.4
151.2 141.2 144.5 143.0
158.7 136.4 134.6 134.3
663.0 608.9 831.3 765.7
976.9 912.9 762.8 708.3
1,068.0 751.7 437.7 437.7
* * 78.3 78.3
385.2 349.2 437.9 435.7




Aircraft and Related Equipment
Missiles and Related Equipment
Military Astronautics
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and
Related Equip.
Other Equipment
Programwide Management & Support
Military Sciences
Aircraft and Related Equipment
Missiles and Related Equipment
i'linLcii) Astronautics
Ships & Small Craft Related Equip
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and
Related Equip.
Other Equipment
Programwide Management & Support
AIR FORCE
Military Sciences
Aircraft and Related Equipment
Missiles and Related Equipment
Military Astronautics
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and
Related Equip.
Other Equipment










23619A 44.9 30.0 36.0 36.0
23625A 16.5 0.0 17.6 17.6
28012A 14.2 • 11.7 12.0 6.0
33111A 10.0 6.0 7.6 5.4
61101&2A 97.1 80.5 80.1 76.3
63302A 75.0 60.0 89.3 83.1
63304A 141.0 141.0 158.0 138.0
63767A 21.0 16.0 14.0 0.0
64206A 12.5 1.5 0.2 0.2
64303A 4.3 2.8 2.9 2.9
64501A 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.0
64601A 11.9 4.9 6.1 6.1
11221N 223.7 202.6 122.7 122.7
11314N 41.0 20.9 19.0 19.0
24122N 274.0 274.0 324.2 319.0
25603N 12.9 8.0 23.3 23.3
61102N 120.5 105.5 106.6 101.6
63314N 20.0 10.0 44.0 44.0
64202N 165.4 140.4 208.0 266.0
64214N 5.0 2.0 10.0 10.0
64303N 67.9 35.0 75.0 75.0
12410F 60.0 40.0 87.0 87.0
27214F 15.0 2.0 0.0 0.0
34111F 159.8 259.8 172.8 172 . 8
35110F 37.2 36.2 37.0 37.0
35121F 525.3 125.3 0.0 0.
41214F 3.0 1.5 0.0 0.0
61101F 5.3 4.3 5.0 5.0
61102F 94.9 80.7 78.3 78.3
62101F 11.0 9.5 8.0 8.0
62102F 25.8 23.3 23.0 23.0
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FY 1970 FY 1971
P.E. REQT APPR REQT APPR
62203F 30.8 26.6 27.0 27.0
62204F 50.1 46.0 44.0 44.0
62302F 28.7 26.7 25.0 25.0
63202F 9.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
63204F 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.0
63214F 12.0 8.0 5.0 5.0
63225F 17.1 10.0 33.6 0.0
63229F 18.5 2.5 2.5 0.0
63311F 121.4 107.0 105.0 100.0
63723F 2.5 1.0 2.0 2.0
64211F 12.0 2.0 27.9 27.9
64307F 50.0 25.0 0.0 0.0
64308F 84.7 75.1 46.0 46.0
64723F 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0
65101F 15.6 12.6 11.0 11.0
65102F 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5
65301F 68.5 63.5 67.5 67.5
65302F 160.9 155.9 118.0 118.0
65705F 23.0 20.5 19.5 19. 5
65706F 12.5 11.2 9.0 9.0
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